Introduction
In most countries immigrants are overrepresented in the unemployment pool, are only eligible for social assistance, and their poverty risk is high. Often it is claimed that they represent a financial burden in terms of public expenditure. Consequently, successful labor market integration of immigrants has become a major issue in most industrialized countries.
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether temporary agency employment (TAE) is a bridge into regular employment for immigrants in Denmark. Albeit recent literature on the stepping stone effect of TAE has shown that TAE is barely a bridge into permanent work (see e.g. Autor, 2009 ), we argue that TAE might be a successful pathway for immigrants into the labor market for three reasons: First, employers have often difficulties observing the productivity of workers educated in a different environment. TAE enables them to reduce information asymmetries and to screen workers without committing themselves to a permanent employment contract. Second, immigrants might be able to build up not only general but also country specific human capital, such as language skills.
Finally, through TAE, immigrants may also get labor market contacts that can later lead to stable jobs.
The paper contributes to the literature in several ways: It is the first paper investigating in detail whether TAE speeds up the integration process in terms of regular employment for immigrants.
Moreover, we refine the timing-of-events approach developed by Abbring and van den Berg (2003) by not only taking explicitly into account the endogeneity of the treatment decision, but also the duration of the treatment itself. Taking into account both sources of endogeneity is of particular interest if one analyses the stepping stone effect of TAE for immigrants as the motivation to accept an agency job is less obvious and immigrants might be less interested in building up a stable employment career if they consider to return to their home country at a later point in time.
Methodological approach
To estimate the effect of TAE on the exit rate from unemployment to employment, both during and after the treatment, we use the timing-of-events approach 1 . The hazard rate into a regular job is assumed to be a Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH):
is a continuous random variable measuring the time from becoming unemployed to being hired into non-temp employment, ( ) is the baseline hazard, x a vector of observed variables, is the unobserved heterogeneity term that accounts for possible selectivity in the exit process. ( ) and ( ) are time-varying indicators, one for being in treatment (d 1 )and one for having been in treatment earlier during unemployment (d 2 ). We model the baseline hazard using a piecewiseconstant specification.
The transition rate into TAE is specified as:
where denotes the time from becoming unemployed until the person finds an agency job.
Next, we extend the timing-of-events approach by modeling explicitly the treatment duration. Let denote the treatment dose which measures the (potentially latent) time until a transition into open unemployment (. The treatment duration is modeled as
The distribution of unobserved variables is approximated non-parametrically by a trivariate discrete distribution with five mass points.
Data
Our analysis is based on Danish register data allowing us to construct workers (un-)employment careers on a weekly basis. 3 We use all immigrants and descendants of immigrants (2. generation) 
Results and Discussion
The selection equations provide no evidence that one particular type of migrants (1 st of 2 nd generation) has a higher transition rate into temp jobs. 4 Coming from non-western countries, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Pakistan is associated with having a lower probability of undertaking temp jobs compared to all other immigrants. The transition rate into TAE is significantly lower for workers receives social assistance when compared to unemployment insurance benefit recipients (men: -0.658, women: -0.727).
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The detailed results for the selection into TAE, out of TAE, and the hazard rate into regular employment are available upon request.
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Regarding selection out of the treatment back into unemployment we find that men with more agency experience have a lower probability of falling back into unemployment (-0.133 ). The number of past treatments increases the probability to re-enter into unemployment, indicating that TAE may stigmatize the unemployed (men: 0.184; women: 0.198). The wage received during temp jobs has no effect on the transition rate back into unemployment. Finally, as expected, the hazard rate into regular employment is lower for all non-western immigrants compared to the reference group of EU-15 immigrants. 0.192) Turning to the causal effects of temp jobs, Table 2 shows that there are fairly high positive intreatment effects. This means that currently working for an agency significantly increases the transition rate to regular employment compared to a similar person in open unemployment. This result confirms earlier findings for the entire Danish population (Jahn and Rosholm, 2010) but the causal effect is considerably larger for immigrants. The post-treatment effects are insignificant, i.e.
having worked for a temp agency at least once earlier in the same unemployment spell causes no increase in the hazard rate to regular employment but also does not harm workers. That immigrants generally profit more from TAE than natives is confirmed by De Graaf et al. (2011) who investigate the stepping stone effect for 'contingent jobs' for the Netherlands.
In order to asses if TAE affects different groups of immigrants differently, Table 2 also presents heterogeneous treatment effects: All unemployed benefit considerably from taking up an agency job in terms of the in-treatment effect. The effect is particularly pronounced for male immigrants who arrived as children, Turkish male immigrants, females from former Yugoslavia, and all recipients of social assistance.
Interestingly, the estimations show that the insignificant post-treatment effect for men is mainly driven by Western and EU-15 immigrants and by persons who immigrated as adults. Maybe for these immigrants it is easier to return to their host country if they continue to be unsuccessful in finding a regular job, an option not available for non-western immigrants, as they are often refugees.
Finally, male recipients of social assistance gain considerably in terms of the post-treatment effects. It seems that for this subgroup TAE may be a means to free themselves from stigma effects which are usually attached to workers who are only eligible for social assistance.
Conclusions
TAE is particularly effective for immigrants from non-western countries, which may be a consequence of employers having difficulties assessing the productivity of workers with different ethnic backgrounds. In this case TAE seems to be a strategy to reduce information asymmetries without risk. As immigrants perform better than natives, it is plausible to presume that the acquisition of language skills on the job planes the path to regular jobs. Moreover, our results show that TAE is particularly beneficial for recipients of social assistance. Therefore this employment form might be well-suited to lower public expenditure in terms of social transfers to immigrants.
